1971 War And Hamoodur Rehman Report

The surrender of East Pakistan in 1971 was a tragic blow to Pakistan. Pakistan was dismembered because of gross weakness, incompetence and neglect of professional duties of Senior Army Commanders including Generals Tikka Khan, Rao Farman Ali, AAK Niazi and President, General Yahya Khan. Mian Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pak Prime Minister after War, set up Hamoodur Rehman Commission to investigate the causes of Pak debacle. Only a small part of the report has been recently ‘Declassified’.

 

 

 

To peruse it on Internet on 49 Anniversary of this great War, was a treat which enabled me, who trained and fought alongside Mukti Vahini, to piece together Pak view for the causes and events, which led to a painfully humiliating, first and only public, surrender in history. I was working with Special Frontier Force (SFF) at that time as part of Special Ops Team to further the plans and assist in the operations of Indian Army, both in East as well in West. SFF participated to give a required Tactical Boost to most of the major operations in East and raids across Border on Western Front. I have tried to enumerate findings of Commission and spice it with my own experience. To that extent, some salient points of this report, to some extent, may be applicable to Indian Army of present date, fighting prolonged Insurgency Battle as well engaged on Northern Borders with prospects of ‘Two Front War’ looming large. It is for Readers and Defence Analysts to decide.

 

 

Seeds of hatred and grievance were sown long ago and nurtured during the two Martial Law periods. In selecting Urdu as the only National Language, West Pakistanis neglected/refuted rich Bengali culture. East Pakistanis had minimum share in Government jobs, Army, Civil and Allied Services; budget allocated for East Pakistan gradually reduced in proportion over the years and development occurred in West but East Pakistan consistently lagged behind throughout 40 years of their existence. Prolonged involvement of Pak Army in Counter Insurgency Operation in East Pakistan only helped to alienate sympathies of local people.

 

 

Eastern Command of Pakistan Army was heavily outnumbered and was clearly not in a position to face the vastly superior Indian Army. It had only Four Divisions (approx 80,000 Troops) and Two Independent Infantry Brigades (approx 10,000 Troops); out of which Two Divisions did not have their Services Arms. Only one Armored Squadron (approx 45 Tanks) was available. General AAK Niazi had failed to anticipate the looming threat of an all out Indian Invasion in spite of enormous Indian build up around the border and repeated warnings from Pak GHQ. As a result, neither preparations to face Indian Army were made before hand nor General AAK Niazi even bother to revise his Battle Strategy. All he did was to hastily raise two ad hoc divisions, namely 36 and 39 by committing his Reserves.

 

Foundations of this defeat were laid in 1958 when Army took over reigns of entire Pakistan. Prolonged involvement in Martial Law duties and Internal Security roles had a devastating impact on the Professional Capabilities of top ranking Officers and Soldiers. Their involvement in Civil Administration, Restoration of Law and Order and to revive Economic Activity detracted them from looking after their Units and Formations simply because they did not have enough time left.

 

Hamoodur Rehman Report accuses General AAK Niazi and his Team for indulging in things from intellectual suppression,amassing wealth, unwarranted killing to things as low as smuggling of pan/zarda and nocturnal visits to places. There were other glaring cases of moral lapse among the officers posted in the highest ranks in East, which had a direct impact on qualities of Leadership and Determination displayed by officers. Officers leading such disreputable way of life could hardly be expected to lead their Army to Victory.

 

 

Pakistan Air Force in the East only had a single base with a single runway. Only one squadron of 12 F 86 Sabres was available and almost the same number of Pilots. There was no High Level Radar. Instead they had only one Low Level Radar which could see up to 20 - 25 miles. Resultantly, PAF only had Four minutes time to scramble its Interceptors when it received alert from low level radar. Initially PAF efficiently provided all sort of Air Support to Pak Army during Anti Insurgency Operations. Three out of 12 aircraft were already down before the outbreak of war, thus leaving PAF with only Nine Aircraft against 10 Indian Squadrons (approx 150 Aircrafts). Dhaka runway was protected by Light Anti Aircraft Artillery which had a range of 7000 feet and this was not sufficient to provide ample protection against Indian Canberra Bombers. Consequently, Dhaka runway was extensively cratered,entire PAF in East was grounded by 06 December and Pilots evacuated to Burma. As per the Report, PAF shot down 11 IAF planes before 06 December,1971.

 

 

 

 

General Yahya Khan, Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan at that time, played a major role in aggravating the worsening political situation in East. Though free and fair elections were held in 1970, results were astounding. Sheikh Mujib's Awami League had won complete majority in East Pakistan while Bhutto's Pakistan People’s Party had a complete majority in West Pakistan. West Pakistani politicians were not willing to accept a Bengali leading the Government. Yahya refused to honour outcome of elections as he was swayed by the ill advice of self centered West Pakistani Politicians. He postponed first National Assembly Session due to be held in Dhaka on/from 02 March,1971. This infuriated East Pakistanis, and subsequently violence ensued throughout the province. Yahya also abolished the one unit system which revived provincial rivalries. In doing so he undid what was achieved by Jinnah and his successors with great effort. He failed to negotiate with Sheikh Mujib and declared Military Action on 26 March,1971.

 

 

It was becoming clear that India will provide Military help to Sheikh Mujib in due course. Therefore, Operational Instruction were issued by Headquarters Pak Easter Command to maintain a "Forward Defensive Posture" by building Fortresses and Strong Points consisting of major towns and district headquarters all around Province and specially Dhaka.These were expected to be made self sufficient in terms of logistics and Troops. They were also expected to act as “Jumping off Points” to attack advancing Indian Army from flanks or from behind, if bypassed. Dhaka was also to be converted into a fortress and defended at all costs. Total of 25 Fortresses and nine Strong Points were envisaged. Troops involved in CI Operation were to fall back to these fortresses in the event of Indian Invasion and were to hold them with delaying actions. Fortress concept was utterly inappropriate to counter the huge Indian invasion from all sides in the hostile conditions prevailing in East Pakistan at that time on account of following reasons;

 

a) There were neither enough men nor equipment to properly man all of these Fortresses. There were only 29 Infantry Battalions at disposal of General AAK Niazi which were clearly not enough to fulfill the requirement;

 

b) These Fortresses did not have protective defenses capabilities for withstanding Armored Attacks;

 

c) There were no reserves with any of the Local Commanders to strike the enemy from flanks or behind if bypassed;

 

d) Due to hostile local population and Mukti Vahini conducting guerrilla raids and ambushes, it was not possible that Troops could move freely in order to mutually support other Fortresses or withdraw to Dhaka Triangle, if overpowered;

 

e) In most cases the withdrawal was a disorderly retreat leaving weapons and equipment behind;

 

f) Yamuna (Jamuna) and Meghna Rivers and their tributaries posed serious hurdles in movement of Pak Troops. People extended local watercraft facilities to invading/advancing Indian Army. Pak Troops were not only denied these, but without help from locals,failed to locate their Ferries while retreating;

 

g) Orders of General AAK Niazi to the effect that ‘no retreat’ was to take place unless and until 75% casualties are suffered, caused significant loss to the Army;

 

h) There were no Logistical Arrangements made for the Troops to fall back to Dhaka if it was threatened by Indian Army and consequently none of Pak Brigades could retreat to take up the defenses of Dhaka;

 

i) If General Niazi had focused on concentrating its Troops around Dhaka behind the big rivers and other natural obstacles, he could have defended it for a much longer time.

 

 

The traditional concept adopted by Pakistan army was that Defense of the East lies in the West. On 03 December,1971,Pak attacked in Western Front through Pre emptive Air Strikes on forward Air Fields of IAF. The idea was to gain territory in the West to compensate for the territory lost in the East in an event of Cease Fire. Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western Front and the half hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened, only hastened the catastrophe in East. India now had the excuse to lawfully invade East.Pak Army offensive in West could not even capture Amritsar or Jammu while the Indians had almost captured Dhaka including most of the countryside. Accepting Cease Fire without significant captured territory any where meant nothing except SURRENDER.

 

 

India, in collaboration with Mukti Bahni, started guerrilla raids inside Pakistani territory from April/May 1971 and invaded East Pakistan on 03 December,1971 with Seven Divisions, Three Independent Infantry Brigades and several Mukti Vahini Brigades, along with full complement of Service Arms. Indian Army, realizing the importance of Dhaka as the military and political lynch pin, advanced orderly towards it from all directions by passing and avoiding confrontations by Pakistani Fortresses wherever possible. Main Indian thrust came through Pak Eastern Sector which provided shortest possible rout to Dhaka. By 06 December,1971, entire PAF was grounded owing to extensive cratering of Dhaka runway by Indian Bombers. IAF had already achieved mastery of air or Air Superiority. On 07 December,1971, major Fortresses of Jessore and Jhendiah in West and Brahmanbaria in East part of erstwhile East Pakistan were shamefully abandoned without a fight. 107 Pak Brigade withdrew to Khulna thus being isolated from Dhaka, while 57 Pak Brigade made no contribution to war after abandoning Jhendiah.

 

On 08 December,1971,Commillia was isolated by encirclement from all sides and on 09 December,1971,Laksham and Kushtia were abandoned. 97 Pak Brigade remained isolated in Chittagong and made no contribution. Entire 39 Pak Division thus disintegrated and on same day, Indian Army reached Meghna River after overcoming increasingly sporadic and dispirited resistance. Stage was now set for the invasion of Dhaka.14 Pak Division could do nothing to halt the Indian advance as its 313 and 202 Brigades were trapped by encirclement in the remote town of Sylhet. Its 27 Brigade stood demoralized and meekly surrendered. Hilli where a determined battle had been fought, was abandoned on 10 December,1971, though elements of 205 Pak Brigade held on to the village of Bogra till the end.93 Pak Brigade retreating from Meymansingh to protect the capital Dhaka got entangled with Second Battalion of Indian Para Brigde and disintegrated along the way. It was First Para Drop in actual War Conditions since Second World War.

 

 

By 14 December 1971, Indian Army had reached on outskirts of Dhaka but NO Pak Troops, except 36 Infantry Brigade which was already located there, came/arrived to take up the defenses of the Capital. General AAK Niazi had been painting a desperate picture of the situation in his messages to President by sending overly exaggerated and unduly pessimistic reports.GHQ Rawalpindi, however, insisted to hold on to Dhaka at least until the United Nations Security Council gave its decision.

 

On 14 December,1971, President General Yahya Khan sent a signal to General AAK Niazi which is reproduced verbatim below:

 

 

This Radio Signal Message was sent as unclassified and thus was clearly intercepted by the Indians. With this desperate message Pak weakness was thoroughly exposed both in front of Indian Generals and the rest of the World. It had a very damaging impact on their case in the UNSC. It was difficult to see how they could expect to secure any success there with this open confession of weakness and clear willingness to accept any terms in Cease Fire. Even nation friendly with Pakistan could hardly help after this. General AAK Niazi later asserted in Court of Inquiry that this message was an order for him to surrender. But careful examination of the tone of this message clearly indicates/interprets that, in view of exaggerated reports sent by him to GHQ, General AAK Niazi was only authorized to surrender, if he in his own judgment felt that it was impossible to fight. It was not a order for surrender.

 

According to his own estimates/statements befor Commission, General AAK Niazi had 26,400 uniformed Troops at the time of surrender with him in Dhaka. With that strength, he could have held out for about two weeks because Indian Army required a week to gather/bring/assemble its Forces around Dhaka and another week to reduce the Fortress. As per remarks of the Commission, Niazi could have died a Hero if he had done so but he had already lost the will to fight and had suffered a complete moral collapse. Therefore, on 15 December, 1971, General AAK Niazi proposed a Cease Fire to Indian COAS, General Sam Manekshaw through US diplomatic channels, which was graciously accepted by Sam. Instead of setting aside his military failures, General AAK Niazi made history for India, not only by presenting a Guard of Honour to victorious Indian Army and its General but by meekly agreeing to lay down the arms in an Unconditional Surrender in full view of Public at Dhaka Race Course. Thus was the fighting reputation, winning glory and mortal fear of Indian Army in 1971 War.