25th Anniversary of the Kargil War calls for Remembrance, Celebration and Introspection

The fifth round of conflict between India and Pakistan was fought in the heights of Kargil, now a part of the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh. Code named Operation Vijay by India and Operation Al Badr by Pakistan, the war lasted for 83 days from 3 May 1999 to 26 July 1999. The short and intense war ended with a decisive victory for India.

The war was necessitated due to Pakistan’s ignoble attempt to occupy the Kargil heights in Indian territories to isolate Ladakh and occupy the Siachen Glacier and at the same time opening a route for ingress of militants into the Kashmir Valley. It culminated on 26 July 1999 with Pakistan lamely announcing the withdrawal of its battered troops when there was very little left to withdraw. Those who had intruded and occupied the heights were mostly killed while the remaining few set out on a difficult journey back home where they faced ignominy and humiliation.

Prime Minister Vajpayee publicly admired the valour and determination of Indian Armed Forces and declared Operation Vijay a glorious victory that helped restore the territorial integrity of India in the face of an unprovoked and unscrupulous intrusion by the Pakistan Army on the established Line of Control (LOC).

Deceit and Treachery by Pakistan

The story of Kargil is one of deceit and treachery by one person, General Pervez Musharraf, then COAS of the Pakistan Army and later Dictator of the country, before dying an ignominious death in exile. To satisfy his personal ego and ambition, he launched Operation Al Badr without the knowledge of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif. In fact, the operation was underway when the Lahore declaration for sustainable peace was being signed between the prime ministers of the two countries on 21 February 1999 as a consequence of the “Bus Diplomacy” initiated by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The war also exposes the treachery of the Pakistani military leadership towards its own organisation and troops that were used as cannon fodder. The chiefs of Pakistan Air Force and Navy and even the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had no knowledge of the operation. It was executed by a few sycophant Generals working under the General who had been placed in command of the forces in Gilgit–Baltistan for this specific purpose.

An eminent Pakistani writer, Altaf Gauhar, has suggested that this operational concept was formulated by General Pervez Musharraf way back in 1987. The plan, however, was set aside as militarily untenable, irrational and internationally indefensible. It was not agreed to by both President Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto. The Pakistan Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO) raised objections, yet again, in December, 1998 when plans of the operation were presented to it. It was then that General Pervez Musharraf decided to go for it on his own when the opportunity presented itself.

Complicit with General Pervez Musharraf were Lt Gen. Aziz Khan, Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army and Second-in-Command to the Chief; Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, General Officer Commanding of the Pakistan 10 Corps under which comes the Force Command Northern Area (FCNA) deployed in Pakistan occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and Major Gen. Javed Hasan, General Officer Commanding of the FCNA. They are referred to as the Kargil Clique.

Poor Planning and Execution by Pakistan

A common factor of all books and papers written about the Kargil War, including those in Pakistan, is the poor planning and execution of the operation that was based on the concept of “Koh Paima.” Koh Paima is a Napoleonic warfare strategy that involves narrow infiltration behind enemy lines and a fast spread to occupy ground of tactical and strategic value.

The Kargil Clique factored in a normal winter, a weak and vacillating Indian reaction, a strong element of surprise, and a strong international intervention for fear of a possible nuclear escalation. All tenuous probabilities not based on rational analysis.

Having decided to launch the operation, it sent in troops of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) for the same. Three intrusion task forces were formed to covertly cross LOC and occupy strategic heights. The first Task Force (TF1), intruded in Dras/Mushkoh sub sector and was composed of 6 NLI,12 NLI and 3 companies of Special Service Group. TF2 comprising 4 NLI, 13 NLI and affiliated troops was earmarked for Kaksar. TF3 comprising 3 NLI, 5 NLI and 8 NLI was intruded in to Batalik/Yaldor sub sector.

The NLI comprises exclusively of troops from Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK). They are less educated, hardy, innocent, well-disciplined and loyal troops, sadly, looked down upon by their Punjabi officer class. They became the cannon fodder, to be sacrificed at the altar of unsustainable ambition.

From January onwards, in the peak of winter, with inadequate clothing and almost zero logistics these troops were sent deep into Indian territory to occupy the heights. A captured diary of a Captain serving with NLI and inducted in February, speaks of temperature at minus 40 degree Celsius, terrifying blizzards, terrible thirst, and lack of food and clothing. The Captain’s untrained and ill equipped column lost eleven men in the approach march itself. It is reported that on 28, March, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf personally camped in the Pakistani Zikria Mustaqar Post astride the Line of Control and manned by 12 NLI to oversee the operation.

Failure of Indian Intelligence

In early March 1999, there were inputs from BSF at Chorbat la about movement of PAF Puma helicopters carrying under slung loads across the LOC, these were probably ignored. Finally, detection of the intrusions was done by a few shepherds and commanders on ground were informed about the presence of armed elements wearing Salwar-Kameez in the heights.

The Pakistani plan was to pass off the intruders as Mujahedeen, however, by beginning May it was clear that the intruders were well equipped trained soldiers of the Pakistan Army of a Division minus strength who had occupied three pockets from Mushkoh and Dras to Yaldar. They were well entrenched and had artillery support.

Occupation of the strategically important Kargil heights by such a vast strength of enemy troops is considered by many defence experts to be an intelligence failure of massive proportions. The only excuse that can be given is that the Indian troops were thinly spread in treacherous mountainous terrain.

Swift and Incisive Response by the Indian Army

Once clarity was achieved, the response of the Indian Army was swift and incisive. Two divisions were mobilised for the attack to retrieve the positions. Five Regiments of 155mm Bofors guns reached the war zone. The government sanctioned the use of the Indian Air Force on 26 May which launched Operation Safed Sagar with Mirage 2000 aircraft that ruled the skies with devastating effect.

8 Sikh recaptured Point 4256 and Point 4440. 16 Grenadiers captured Point 4480 by 16 May 1999. Tololing and Point 4590 were captured on 13 June. Point 4760, Black Rock and three pimples were captured on 29 June. The battle for Tiger Hill was won after great effort and sacrifice.

Saga of Courage and Valour of Indian Troops

There are so many soldiers who made supreme sacrifices or were severely wounded during the Kargil war. They sacrificed all for the safety and integrity of the Nation. The saga of those who won the highest gallantry award of the nation, the Param Vir Chakra (PVC), in the course of the war is briefly narrated to give an idea of what the operation entailed in terms of courage and valour beyond the call of duty in the face of the most challenging odds

Captain Vikram Batra, PVC (Posthumous)

Known as Sher Shah in the Kargil War, Captain Vikram Batra, had less than two years’ service when he went into war. His Battalion, 13 Jammu Kashmir Rifles, was tasked to regain Point 5140, for which he volunteered and chose “Dil Maange More” as the success password which later became folklore. His team captured the heavily defended feature. The commanding officer Lt. Col. YK Joshi appreciated the need for immediate capture of the neighbouring Point 4875. Captain Vikram Batra insisted on going in since he was already quite near to the objective. He led the advance without care for his personal safety and was hit by a volley of Light Machine Gun fire. He crawled to the bunker profusely bleeding and lobbed a grenade thus silencing the enemy. The Indian Tricolour was soon placed on Point 4875. Point 4875 has been renamed “Batra Top.”

Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, PVC (Posthumous)

Lieutenant Manoj Pandey went to war with less than one year of service with his unit 1/11 Gorkha Rifles. He was ordered to dislodge a firmly entrenched enemy in the Kalubar Hill and Jabuar Top of the Yaldar Sector. Young Manoj led the assault personally under cover of darkness and got into hand to hand conflict with his Khukhri. The team cleared some parts but while heading for Jabuar Top it got day-lighted. Due to heavy fire, Manoj sustained multiple bullet injuries but continued the assault. Finally, Kalubar and Jabuar were captured even as Lieutenant Manoj Pandey died a hero.

Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav, PVC

18 Grenadiers, the parent unit of Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav, was tasked to capture Tololing Top. The assault was launched on 12 June. Yogender Yadav was the leading scout of the Commando platoon that took a rear cliff approach and climbed with the help of slithering ropes. When the battle was joined he was hit by several bullets but he kept crawling forward. His platoon was reduced to half but he did not give up. Finally, the platoon cleared the positions. This was the first Indian victory of the war. Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav was evacuated by Air to Army Hospital, Delhi almost dead, but he survived.

Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, PVC

For the assault on Point 4875 (later Batra Top) Rifleman Sanjay Kumar of 13 Jammu Kashmir Rifles along with his buddy were the leading scouts. The team came under heavy fire and Sanjay told his buddy to give covering fire while he charged at the post. He was hit on the shoulder but continued crawling forward and entered the enemy fortification where he killed the enemy in close combat. Despite bleeding profusely Rifleman Sanjay Kumar then rushed to the next fortification which surprised the enemy who abandoned their position. Having finished his ammunition, he picked up an abandoned enemy machine gun and shot dead the fleeing soldiers. Thus he helped in the capture of Point 4875.

Ten infantry battalions were also awarded Battle Honour and the title of ‘Bravest of the Brave.’ We salute our War heroes, especially those who did not come back. “Do not lament the death of a warrior on the battlefield, they are honoured in Heaven.”

The Admission of Defeat

Nawaz Sharif rushed to the USA to solicit assistance. The same day Muskoh and Dras area were recaptured and cleared. From 12 July to 18 July, withdrawal of Pakistan troops was permitted. Finally, Zulu Spur was taken on 24 July and the sanctity of the LOC was restored. On 26 July 1999 the Prime Minister of India declared the complete victory of the Indian Armed Forces and cessation of operations. The cost of victory was high, 22 officers, 21 JCOs and 452 brave soldiers of India made the supreme sacrifice. Casualties on the Pakistan side ran in thousands, Nawaz Sharif puts them down to nearly 4000.

Conclusion

A similar state of imbalance between the political establishment and the Pakistan Army continues to exist, more so in the present context where successive prime ministers of the country continue to remain puppets of the Pakistan Army. The criticality is compounded by the unlimited power exuded by fundamentalist militant war lords who are aligned against India.

While getting into a celebratory mood in view of the great victory it is also important to remember that the India Army was not adequately prepared for the enemy action. There was an intelligence failure and shortages to contend with which compelled the then Indian Army Chief, General VP Malik to ominously state, “We will fight with what we have.”

The Government of the day within three days of the victory set up a committee, “To examine the sequence of events and make recommendations for the future.” The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) extensively reviewed the developments and gave extensive recommendations on the measures to be undertaken to prevent such an occurrence in the future. Sadly, the recommendations of the committee have not been fully implemented even in part twenty-five years after the battle. Such procrastination in matters of defence and security do not augur well for the nation.

This is an apt occasion to rise above petty egos and blinkered viewpoints and look at the national cause in its entirety. While showering laurels in the Kargil martyrs and heroes, it is also important to ensure that the serving soldiers have what they want to guard the Nation. To keep them in high morale is a national responsibility. The Nation should take a vow to never let its soldiers remain wanting for anything whatsoever.