Sidhu - Neo Revolutionary in the Making! (Part II)

If one wants to understand the evolving course being charted by Sidhu, one must have full insight into the historical growth processes of Punjab – vital particularlyfor 30-year old post 1990 generation.

The significant historic pre 1947 Sikhism landmarks include: A.D. 1499 — Mystique promoted; A.D. 1699 —Unique identity of the Khalsa; A.D. 1799-1848 — Ranjit Singh’s Sikh empire; A.D. 1857 — Saviours of British Raj; A.D. 1907 — Gwadar rebellion; A.D. 1919 — Jallianwala Bagh Massacre; A.D. 1920 — Central Sikh League, SGPC and Alkali Dal formed; and A.D. 1946 — Homeland demand before CRIPPS mission.

One, Punjab was always the epi-centre of conflicts. Invaders rummaged through Punjab for many centuries. Lessons of Punjab are explicit. Identity and ideological crises are real. The Sikhs are sensitive, emotive and assertive. They can rally around unresolved issues to incinerate the state at any time. No escape from religious fundamentalism. Today, Khalistan terrorism remains at a low-key level waiting for an opportune to rise again.

Two, Guru Nanak in search of truth based on aversion to the practices of both Hinduism and Islam created a higher order religion, but in a spirit of cooperation with the other two religions. Sikhism started on the tenets of Nam, Dan, Isnam, Sevan and Simran.

Three, initially, Sikhism grew out of both Hindu and Muslim ranks – harmonious relationships with both Muslims and Hindus based on cooperative coexistence. Subsequently only, Sikhism grew out of Hindu ranks. As per Khushwant Singh, the custom of bringing up one son as a Sikh grew amongst many Panjabi Hindu families, which was basically to confront the Muslims. For example, teacher Tara Chand became Master Tara Singh and played a dubious role throughout his life.

Four, Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth Guru, 200 years later in 1699, developed the mystique of its special identity - ‘Singh’, ‘Khalsa’ and the concept of “Kes, Kangha, Kacha, Kara and Kripan”. Even the politico-religious invocation ‘Raj karega Khalsa’ (’The Sikh will rule’) was coined. Banda Bahadur (Brave Slave), a fanatic Rajput convert, was responsible for the rapid spread of Sikhism in Punjab. Guru Gobind Singh was killed in October 1708 and Banda Bahadur executed in June 1716.

Five, the real Sikh-Muslim conflict broke out during Guru Arjun era due to active role in the Mughal succession issue. The death of Guru Arjun while in the captivity of Jahangir, the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the killing of two sons of Guru Gobind Singh and the depredations of Nadir Shah and Abadali’s rampaging hordes, including the destruction of the Golden Temple during the sixth invasion between 1747-1769, left a deep scar on the Sikh psyche, which promoted an aggregated hatred for the Muslims. Post-partition massacres further accentuated their hatred.

Six, Ranjit Singh’s period, nonetheless, is the high watermark of the Sikhs, which was based on secular Sikh-Muslim-Hindu unity. The Sikh armies captured Lahore, Srinagar and Kabul led by Sikh, Dogra and Muslim leaders. The Sikh Pant proclaimed the Sikh kingdom and conferred the title of Maharaja. The Sikh empire covered Tibet in the North, extended beyond the Sutlej in the South-east and across the Himalayas to Afghanistan. But, the succession drama by his seven sons by different mothers, which followed his death, led to its disintegration and degeneration. Ranjit Singh represented India’s last coordinated effort to arrest the expansion and consolidation of British colonialism

Seven, during the Mutiny of 1857, it was the Sikh, Dogra and Punjabi Muslim soldiers who saved the British Raj. In turn, the British gave the Sikhs the most exalted status and adopted an appeasement policy towards them. The Sikhs were given the best share of loot of Delhi, canals and vast farms, besides a phenomenal 20 per cent share of enrolment in the British Imperial Army. Slowly, Sikhism degenerated, but was able to contain the Arya Samaj, Nirankari and Radh Soamis threat by launching the first Gurudwara Movement. However, major Anglo-Sikh irritants also developed to include: the Gwadhar Rebellion in 1907 against the Colonisation Bill levying higher land revenue; the Jallianwala Bagh massacres in April 1919; pro-Mahant British stance during the Gurudwara Movement; and non-acceptance of Sikh demand for a separate homeland by the Cripps Mission in 1946.

Eight, all Sikh institutions were largely organised before and during the First Gurudwara Reform Movement (1920-1925) launched to unseat the corrupt and pliable Mahant's to include: Sri Guru Singh Sabha and its political wing of the Chief Khalsa Dewan were organised in 1873 and 1887 respectively; in November 1920, the Central Sikh League was reorganised as Central Gurudwara Committee (now known as the SGPC); and in December 1920, its political wing, Akali Dal, was formed. As per M.J. Akbar, the ‘Sabha’ was established “to restore Sikh confidence and to defend Sikh faith against the Arya Samaj and the Christian missionaries.”

And, the Akalis controlled the SGPC. Its objective was simple—to protect Sikhism from all other faiths. It highlights their deep commitment that it is not possible to protect Sikhism without controlling political power. The Akali Dal’s constitution and its basic philosophy rest on the principle of the two-sword principle: ‘Miri’ and ‘Piri’ implying that the temporal and spiritual powers flow from religion. Thus, religion and politics are inseparable; and religion must guide politics. Whilst the Akhal Takhat is the symbol of temporal power, Harmandir Sahib symbolises spiritual power.

In sum, Sikhism is a unique indigenous politico-religious philosophy whose potential for survival is dependent on non-deviant behaviour from its followers. In reality, rapidity of Sikhism’s growth and its attempts to seek a secure geographical area to practise religion resulted in a life and death confrontation between the Sikhs and the Muslims. Most important to note, some leaders sought a Sikh state in Pakistan with the right to secede, which Jinnah refused. Thus, Sikhs suffered from cumulative hatred against the Muslims.

During the pre-independence period, in the words of Amarjit Kaur (an ex-MP), “the younger elements within the Akalis Dal who were for a separate state might have been defeated at that point of history; but they were not deterred from working for this goal.”

Post-Independence, moderation and fundamentalism characterise Sikh postures or occupy the two ends of the continuum. They flow directly out of the Akali Dal-SGPC politics. They oscillate as per political temperatures in the state.

First, the evolution of the state of Punjab makes an interesting study. East Punjab (35% Sikhs) in August 1947; PEPSU (49.3% Sikhs) in 1948; and Punjab (56% Sikhs) in 1966 represent the evolution of the state of Punjab. Yet, the Sikh majority did not favour the Akalis to enjoy unchallenged political power. During this period, the Akali Dal was confined to religious activity. In 1948, its prominent leaders joined the Congress Party to reap post-partition rehabilitation benefits. Even Master Tara Singh withdrew from politics.

Second, in 1956, the Sikh demand for a separate state based on Punjabi language by the States Reorganisation Committee was rejected due to Nehru’s anti-Punjabi politics. The Hindu fanatics provided an opportunity to Master Tara Singh to launch the ‘Punjabi Suba’ agitation in 1957. The Akali Dal re-entered active politics. And, they sought an unequal alliance with the Congress Party. In fact, the Akali Dal could not produce a single leader to counter Pratap Singh Kairon’s dynamic leadership.

Third, in January 1960, Master Tara Singh secured control of the SGPC by contesting on the ‘Punjabi Suba (State)’ platform. When he was arrested in April 1960, Sant Fateh Singh assumed the Akali leadership and went on a fast unto death (22 days).

Fourth, in the 1960s, the Green and the White revolutions promoted prosperity and spurt in education. The Sikhs migrated in large numbers to foreign nations. Furthermore, socially there was degeneration of Sikh youth: liquor, drugs, cigarettes and shaving of beards, which threatened their distinctive identity and martial character. Rich urban Hindu concentrations – Lalas, the Business community - gained control over economy and acquired disproportionate wealth – an eye-sore for the Sikhs.

Fifth, even Master Tara Singh attempted a fake fast unto' death (40 days), which got him into disrepute and resulted in his removal from both the SGPC and the Akali Dal. He formed his own Akali Dal, which passed resolutions both in 1965 and 1966 seeking a self-determined status within the Republic of India. However, it was not the confrontation tactics of the Akali religious leaders, but the patriotism of the Sikh masses both in the 1962 and the 1965 wars, which secured the present Punjab for them in 1966. However, the indecision on transfer of Chandigarh, once again, gave the Akalis cause for continuing their confrontation tactics, although Sant Fateh Singh accepted the award.

Sixth, on the political front, the Akali Dal groups forged an alliance with the Communists in 1967 to somehow win elections. In March 1967, although the Congress Party emerged as the single largest party (48 out of 104 seats), the Akali groups combined with divergent opposition parties and formed a coalition government. In November 1967, Tara Singh’s hardliners defected under Congress guidance and formed a minority government with the Congress Party support from outside. In August 1968 when the Congress Party withdrew support, the President’s Rule was imposed.

Seventh, in 1969, the first signs of Sikh extremist fundamentalism manifested when Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, former finance minister of Punjab, proclaimed the Sovereign Republic of Khalistan in London, which was treated as a big Sikh joke. Also, Darshan Singh Pheruman expired after 74 days fast for the transfer of Chandigarh. Meanwhile, Gurnam Singh extended his party’s support to Indira Gandhi during the Congress crisis in 1969. The Akalis won the 1969 elections and formed a coalition government with the Jana Sangh.

Eighth, on 26 January 1970, Sant Fateh Singh undertook a second fast unto death. On the 8th day of Sant’s fast, Indira Gandhi announced the award of Chandigarh to Punjab. It led to a confrontation between the religious and political leadership over who should get the credit, which resulted in Gurnam Singh’s expulsion and appointment of Prakash Singh Badal as the chief minister.

Finally, there was a large Hindu influx, particularly farm labour, which disturbed the population structure of Punjab (61% Sikhs in 1971 reduced to 52% in 1981). Due to P.S. Badal’s pro-peasant policies, the Akalis were wiped out during the 1971 and 1972 elections. Out of power, the Akalis hardened their postures and adopted the controversial Anandapur Sahib resolution in October 1973.

Basically, the Anandapur Sahib Resolution included: two religious demands -legislation of All India Gurudwara Act and free access to all Sikh shrines including Nankana Sahib in Pakistan; restructuring of the Constitution on real federal principles and restoration of Panjabi-speaking areas to Punjab; Sikh recruitment and arms issues; and River Waters Distribution and control over Headwork’s It was drafted by a group of eminent Sikh intellectuals. Its fallout was simple. Subsequently, whenever the Akali Dal could not form a government, it extrapolated the Sikh homeland issue and invoked the Hindu Bogey.

The emergency of 1975, however, delayed escalation of the Akali confrontation, which was followed by the resounding victory of the Akali Dal-Janata Party coalition. In power, the Akalis remained subdued on Anandapur Sahib Resolution.

Next, the most significant historic development was the rise of Sant Bhindernwale - most controversial/sinister politics. Zail Singh, former president of India, and the Congress (I) sponsored the emergence of both Bhindernwale and Dal Khalsa with a view to countervail the Akali Dal’s clout. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob have produced adequate circumstantial evidence to prove that “the man who had been the Chief Minister of Punjab and was to go on to become the Home Minister in the Central Cabinet and then President of India, continued to promote its cause.” In August 1977, Bhindernwale became the head of Damdama Taksal, prime Sikh monastery and avowed commitment to Khalistan and violent means.

Ipso facto, Zail Singh as home minister allowed Bhindernwale to actively support the Congress (I) candidates in selected constituencies during the 1980 elections. He ordered the release of Bhindernwale after he was arrested on Darbara Singh’s orders in October 1981. More important, he allowed Bhindernwale triumphant visit to Delhi with his supporters brandishing weapons and spreading Sikh-Hindu hatred in April 1982.

Meanwhile, power struggles within the Akali Dal became endemic. Dal Khalsa was organised by the hardliners on 13 April 1978, with the avowed aim of demanding the creation of an independent sovereign Sikh state. The Dal Khalsa challenged the Akali Dal in the SGPC elections with the backing of Bhindernwale, but lost the elections. It advocated the use of violence to achieve its objectives. The Dal Khalsa established a branch in UK on 4 January 1983 in West Germany in June 1983; in Canada in 1981. In May 1983, the group held a joint meeting with the Babbar Khalsa, Vancouver, in London and raised the banner of revolt. The crisis became international. The extremist strategy was aimed at driving out the Hindus, thereby enabling Sikh influx to ensure a large majority aimed at removing political anomaly.

Alongside, the Babbar Khalsa, a political offshoot of Akhand Kirtani Jatha, was established in 1978. This group looked upon the Jewish struggle for the creation of Israel as a model for organising its activities. It considered Pakistan as its natural and cultural neighbour and stressed that members of the Sikh community abroad would have an important role to play in the liberation of Khalistan.

The Dal Khalsa was responsible for hijacking an Indian airline aircraft to Lahore on 29 September 1981 and the acts of sacrileges in Amritsar on 26 April 1982. However, both groups claim responsibility for the killing of Lala Jagat Narain and D.I.G. Atwal. The police crackdown on the Dal Khalsa in the aftermath of the Indian Airlines hijacking incident resulted in its members seeking refuge in the Golden Temple.

In sum, religious fundamentalism and terrorism were twin tenets of Bhindernwale phenomenon. He adopted the process of intimidation and terrorisation of the Hindus to achieve well-defined politico-religious objectives of driving Hindus out of Punjab and ensuring the return of the Sikhs living outside Punjab. It presents an interesting similarity with the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine.

Furthermore, Bhindernwale exploited contemporary political developments to promote politico-religious interests of the Sikhs, whereas, political parties attempted to exploit his emergence to further vested interests instead of overall national interests. In the ultimate analysis, his legacy succeeded in creating a wedge in Hindu-Sikh relations and demonstrated the potency of extremist terrorism as an internal security threat.

Bhindernwale cult of extremist violence took a significant toll of its opponents, irrespective of religion. He attempted to engineer a clash with the Nirankaris on 13 April 1978 on Baisakhi day, which resulted in the death of 13 Sikhs due to police firing. In retaliation, Baba Gurucharan Singh, head of the Nirankari Mission in Delhi was killed on 24 April 1980. In September 1980, the Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Lahore. Lala Jagat Narain, editor of Hind Samachar and Arya Samaj activist was killed on 9 September 1981.

If the Congress (I) attempted appeasement between 1978 and 1982, whilst out of power in Punjab, to serve its vested interests, even the Akali Dal joined the bandwagon of riding the tiger to protect and consolidate its hold on Sikh affairs and thwart Congress (I) designs. As a result, political rivalry for pre-eminence unwittingly promoted dangerous extremist-cum-terrorist religious fundamentalism.

Meanwhile, desecration of Hindu religious places was launched to provoke Hindu backlash elsewhere. As Bhindernwale campaign of violence escalated, even the Akali Dal decided to match it with its own brand of militancy— declared a holy war against the government and masterminded the Jail Barao agitation. Later, they stormed the parliament and followed it up with a succession of agitations: Nahar Roko (canals blockade), Rail Roko (railway blockade), and Rasta Roko (road blockade) and Kam Roko (work stoppage). Even a ‘Morcha’ was launched to demand the release of Amrik Singh, Bhindranwale’s right-hand man, and the President of the AISSF in July 1982.

By mid-1982, the Bhindernwale phenomenon became transparent. He too chose to conduct his fight for Khalistan from the Golden Temple. The Akalis became silent bystanders. They were a divided house: P.S. Badal advocated moderation; Tohra advocated support to the extremists; and, Longowal steered the mid-course. All of them dithered, but agreed that the party would be isolated, if they failed to do something. So, they too joined the talk of Holy War to realise the demands listed in Anandapur Sahib Resolution.

In 1983, President’s Rule was imposed. A number of peace initiatives and negotiations were attempted, but failed due to lack of political will out of fear losing the Hindu vote banks. Meanwhile, Bhindernwale wrested the initiative and control inside the Golden Temple after a bitter struggle with Longowal and the high priests, and entrenched himself for the final showdown. The last minute negotiations between Tohra and Bhindernwale failed with the emergence of Hindu Suraksha Samiti. At this stage, Longowal issued the call for a bandh to prevent the transfer of food grains. It forced the government to issue orders to the army to conduct operations inside the Golden Temple.

The army conducted Operation Blue star between 4 and 7 June 1984. Longowal, Tohra and Harmandir Singh Sandhu of AISSF along with 400 others surrendered. Bhindernwale was killed. The Sikhs all over the world mourned. Yet, violence did not recede.

On 9 June 1984, Jagjit Singh Chauhan called upon patriotic Sikhs to rise up and assassinate Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv and the senior military officers who conducted the operation. He organised Sikh terrorist groups under the aegis of the World Sikh Organisation founded in New York in July 1984, as a response to the desecration of the Golden Temple, based on Sikhs residing in five foreign nations: USA, Canada, Great Britain, Norway and Holland. Others to attend the convention were: Kashmir Liberation Front, Tamil separatist organisations and Afghan Mujahedeen.

The Sikh extremists struck on 31 October 1984. Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards murdered her and the Hindus mourned. Some of the Sikhs rejoiced. The high priests, who condemned the act first, withdrew it 24 hours later accentuating the estranged feelings. Then broke out Hindu-Sikh communal riots in Delhi and in other places led by Congress (I) activists. Fortuitously, Sikh extremists maintained a low profile in Punjab. Apprehending police brutalities, a large number of youth crossed over to Pakistan, - where they were indoctrinated, trained and issued weapons by Pakistan’s ISI.

All-important Akali leaders, except P.S. Badal, were arrested. It created a void in the Akali leadership and led to its splinterization and marginalisation. Thus, when the central government attempted its political initiatives by releasing Akali leaders, it did not dramatically alter' the situation. Attempted reunification of Longowal and Talwandi groups failed to materialise. Instead, a truncated United Akali Dal (UAD) under Baba Joginder Singh (father of Bhindernwale) emerged.

Meanwhile, the terrorist strategy was simple. It aimed at teaching a lesson to anyone attempting at negotiating an accord with the central government. In January 1985, terrorists attacked Giani Kirpal Singh, the head priest of Akal Takht, in broad daylight and inflicted serious injuries. However, he survived.

Ultimately, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord was signed in July 1985. It became a non-starter due to the factional politics of the Akali Dal. Even Badal and Tohra denounced and refused to endorse the Accord in the party meeting. Such was the awesome might of the militant’s gun. It was followed by Longowal assassination on 20 August 1985, which naturally imposed caution even amongst the moderates.

None the less, Longowal Akali Dal won the elections in September 1985. Barnala became the party leader and the Chief Minister instead of Badal. The TADA (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities) Prevention Act 1985 was promulgated to counter terrorist menace.

Meanwhile, both the SGPC and the Akal Takhat were, once again, taken over by the radicals of the Damdam Taksal and the AISSF. In November 1985, Giani Sahib Singh, the head granthi of the Golden Temple, was shot within the Golden Temple complex on the morning of Guru Nanak’s birthday. But, he survived. Next, the militants dismissed the moderate religious leadership for their alleged collaboration with the government and passed excommunication orders against Zail Singh, the president of India, and Buta Singh, the home minister, at a truncated Sarbat Khalsa Convention on 26 January 1986. The combined militant groups selected a Panthic Committee as an apex body. However, moderates held yet another Sarbat Khalsa at Anandapur and revoked the orders issued by the radicals. At such a crucial stage, Badal walked out of the Akali Dal (Longowal) to form a separate group.

In April 1986, Operation Black Thunder, a police action, was launched inside the Golden Temple, when the Panthic Committee (Militant-sponsored religious leadership) announced the declaration of a separate state of Khalistan and proclaimed its intention to seek a UN seat. Meanwhile on 10 August 1986, General A.S. Vaidya, former chief of army staff, was shot dead in broad daylight in Pune. On 3 October 1986, there was an attempt made to kill Ribeiro, the DGP, at the Punjab Armed Police Campus, in Jullundur.

Meanwhile, Barnala’s image suffered a blow when his candidate was defeated in the SGPC elections in November 1986. Tohra was re-elected as, its president with Badal’s support. In December 1986, both Tohra and Badal were arrested to neutralise their increasing power potential, which only assisted the growth of militancy.

Next, the high drama of removal of high priests of religious institutions was enacted. Prof. Darshan Singh Ragi was appointed as the head priest of Akal Takhat. The newly appointed head priests issued the Hukumnama ordering Akali leaders to submit their resignations to refacilitate the formation of UAD. In response, both Badal and Joginder Singh submitted their resignations, whereas Barnala refused. So, the head priests declared him Tankhaiya and excommunicated him. In May 1987, the President’s rule was re-imposed.

At this stage, even the UAD withdrew in favour of militants to run Sikh affairs. In September 1987, the high priests too gave a call to the Sikhs to reject the Akali Dal in favour of militants, which the SGPC challenged. It led to the arrest of high priests, who were later released in March 1988 as part of yet another political initiative. In May 1988, Jasbir Singh Rode was appointed as the jathedar of Akal Takhat.

In February 1988, the government attempted a political initiative to have a dialogue with jathedar and Sikh politicians lodged in Jodhpur jail, as detenus for over four years, who claimed that they could influence the militants. Five jathedar and 40 detenus were released. The security forces’ pressure was relieved as a concession which the militants took advantage of and started rallying all over again in the Golden Temple.

Thus, the second police action, Operation Black Thunder II, was launched inside the Golden Temple in May 1988. It was a remarkable success and an effective blow to fundamentalist militancy-cum terrorism. It was followed by the appointment of Sant Thakur Singh as the chief of Damdama Taksal and Dharshan Singh as the jathedar of Akal Takhat. It heralded the end of the Bhindernwale era.

By then, several terrorist outfits had sprung up, such as, Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Liberation Front, Bhindernwale Tiger Force, Khalistan Liberation Organisation, Shelly Regiment and so on. When their top leadership was killed/captured, the groups fell into the hands of criminals. Many poor youth with rural socio-economic background and lack of ideological commitment joined their ranks. Many joined under fear of reprisals both from the police and the terrorists Criminals/smugglers enjoying Pakistani support carried out extortions/murders/rapes. Sikhs living in foreign nations no longer blindly lent support to militants out of revulsion to violence and fear of amendment of refugee laws.

In the ultimate analysis, the main cause for the Punjab internal crisis is primarily psychological - Volatile politico-religious interface. Basically, it is due to disgruntled leadership irrespective of party affiliations - Self-centric politico-religious leadership. The Sikh identity crisis was due to population migrations besides “Bogey of Hindu revivalism, assimilation and absorption”, upsetting politico-socio-economic structural balances and equilibrium, which was exploited to create anarchy.

Today, the Sikh majority, particularly urbanites, are mostly moderates. They do not support and cooperate with the militants, but they are sullen towards the government’s initiatives. Fortunately, people have not polarised on communal lines so far. There are still many examples of Sikh-Hindu unity in countering terrorist violence.

After independence, the government attempted a number of half-baked political initiatives which included: redrawing of boundaries of the state; announcement of Chandigarh Award in 1969; Indira Gandhi’s negotiation attempts between 1982 and 1984; Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 1985; announcement of various commissions on Chandigarh and sharing of waters; appointment of judicial investigations into anti-Sikh riots; and release of head priests. However, both Haryana and Punjab governments displayed uncompromising attitudes out of fear of losing their vote banks. Even the role of opposition political parties is dubious.

Finally, the Punjab problem is unique in many ways. People are extremely sensitive and highly volatile. The fruits of economic developments have not convinced the Sikhs that their interests will be better served and they can live with dignity, honour and respect. It is not easy to accurately assess people’s aspirations, particularly their subconscious enlightened self-interest. Of course, the religious leadership have regained control, but still unable to reassert its authority. Amongst Akalis, there is unlikely to be unity.

Viewed in the above historic course of developments and events, and conjointly reviewed from the “Modern Mahabharata” during the past 72-years, far more viciously and venomously churning than ever before in the past, in the name of liberalism, freedom of speech and human rights, democracy, the situation can rapidly spin out of control by disgruntled political leadership in ruthless pursuit of power.

Is Sidhu pursuing such a course aided and abetted by Rahul Ghandy and Imran Khan – his ‘Yar”? As one commentator remarked “Political debate right now is a blood sport.” His acerbic wit can easily polarise Sikh community on war path. After all, tribalism is part of evolutionary DNA. Ipso facto, ours is a fractured and factitious society. And, Sidhu has the capability to all over again to exploit the fault lines in the society to reconsolidate and polarise religious fundamentalists in the name of the higher politico-religious cause ordained by the Gurus.

Finally, the latest Pakistani factor is to use the Kartarpur corridor to promote Khalistan militancy, narcotic drugs and infiltration of Islamist radical terrorists. “Pakistan has a hidden agenda behind the opening of the Kartarpur corridor”, Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh stated, adding that India "will have to be careful" – conspiracy of Pak Army and the ISI. (Concluded)